

Privacy-Preserving Authorization Schemes

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State-of-the art: client-server

- ❖ Server grants or denies privileges to client, according to client's identity
- ❖ Personal data **must** be recorded: evidence in case of dispute

This paradigm is obsolete

- ❖ Internet transactions involve more than 2 parties (e.g., customer, merchant, credit card company, banks, delivery company, ...)
- ❖ The parties have different, competing interests
=> mutually suspicious

Need-to-know principle

- ❖ A merchant does not need to know the real identity of a customer, only the validity of the money order
- ❖ The customer's bank does not need to know the identity of the merchant, only the reference of his bank account
- ❖ Etc.


... of course

- ❖ Real identities would be disclosed to a judge in case of dispute, or on request by judicial authorities (to prevent money laundering, for instance)

Proofs of Authorization (1)

- ❖ Restricted certificates:
 - Different certificates as proofs of different attributes:
ex. majority, driving license, ...
 - "Partial Revelation of Certified Identity"
by F. Boudot, CARDIS 2000
 - Pbs: linkability, evidence collection, revocation, ...

Proofs of Authorization (2): MAFTIA



MAFTIA project



- ❖ **Malicious- and Accidental-Fault Tolerance in Internet Applications**
- ❖ European project IST-1999-11583
<http://www.research.ec.org/maftia>
- ❖ Jan.2000 - Dec.2002
5.5 M€, 45 person.years