



# MAFTIA's Dependability Concepts

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## MAFTIA



IST Dependability Initiative  
Cross Program Action 2  
*Dependability in services and technologies*

**Malicious- and Accidental-Fault Tolerance for Internet Applications**

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*c. 55 man-years, EU funding c. 2.5M€*  
Jan. 2000 -> Dec. 2002 (Feb. 2003)

# Objectives

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
- ❖ Architectural framework and conceptual model (WP1)
- ❖ Mechanisms and protocols:
  - dependable middleware (WP2)
  - large scale intrusion detection systems (WP3)
  - dependable trusted third parties (WP4)
  - distributed authorization mechanisms (WP5)
- ❖ Validation and assessment techniques (WP6)

# Summary

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- ❖ Causal chain of impairments
- ❖ Security policy and security failure
- ❖ Intrusion, attack and vulnerability
- ❖ Security methods
- ❖ Fault tolerance
- ❖ Intrusion detection
- ❖ Integrated intrusion detection/tolerance framework

# Causal Chain of Impairments



# Security Policy


- ❖ Security properties which are to be fulfilled by the system

Confidentiality

Integrity


Availability

- ❖ Rules according to which the system security state may evolve




# Security Failure

- ❖ Violation of a security property of intended security policy




## Fault Model




- ❖ **attack** - malicious external activity aiming to intentionally violate one or more security properties; an *intrusion* attempt
- ❖ **vulnerability** - a malicious or non-malicious fault, in the requirements, the specification, the design or the configuration of the system, or in the way it is used, that could be exploited to create an *intrusion*
- ❖ **intrusion** - a malicious fault resulting from an *attack* that has been successful in exploiting a *vulnerability*


# Fault Model: Recursion



# Malicious Fault Model: Recursion?




# Outsiders or Insiders: Privilege




- ❖ **Theft of privilege:** unauthorized increase in privilege
- ❖ **Abuse of privilege:** improper use of authorized operations
- ❖ **Outsider:** current privilege does not intersect considered domain
- ❖ **Insider:** current privilege intersects considered domain




# Dependability Methods




# Prevention, Tolerance and Removal




# Security Methods

		Attack	Vulnerability	Intrusion
<b>Prevention</b>	<i>how to prevent the occurrence or introduction of...</i>	deterrence, laws, social pressure, secret service...	security policy, semi-formal and formal specification, rigorous design and management...	firewalls, authentication, authorization... (+ <b>attack prevention</b> <b>vulnerability prevention</b> )
<b>Tolerance</b>	<i>how to provide a service capable of or implementing the system function despite...</i>	<b>vulnerability prevention</b> <b>vulnerability removal</b> <b>intrusion tolerance</b>	= <b>intrusion tolerance</b>	<b>confinement</b> , <b>detection/recovery</b> , <b>masking</b> (e.g. FRS), + <b>intrusion detection</b> for fault treatment 
<b>Removal</b>	<i>how to reduce the presence (number, severity) of...</i>	not applicable	<b>formal proof</b> , <b>model-checking</b> , <b>inspection</b> , <b>test</b> ... 	not applicable
<b>Forecasting</b>	<i>how to estimate the creation and consequences of...</i>	<b>intelligence gathering</b> , <b>threat assessment</b> , <b>attack warning</b> ...	<b>assess presence of vulnerabilities</b> , <b>exploitation difficulty</b> , <b>potential consequences</b> 	<b>vulnerability forecasting</b> , <b>attack forecasting</b>


# Fault Tolerance



# Error Detection



# Anomaly vs Misuse Detection



## Preemptive Error Detection

[Avizienis, Laprie & Randell 2001]  
(as opposed to concurrent error detection)


- ❖ Core concepts: AKA "built-in test"
  - > e.g., Memory scrubbing
- ❖ Interpretation wrt malicious faults
  - Vulnerability scanning
  - Configuration checking

# (Damage assessment)


- ❖ Core concepts: aims to evaluate extent of error propagation before initiating recovery
  - How many checkpoints to rollback?
  - How many processes affected before detection?
- ❖ Interpretation?
  - How many files have been corrupted by an intruder, and thus need to be restored *before use*?

## Error Recovery


### Backward recovery



### Forward recovery




### Compensation-based recovery (fault masking)



# Error Recovery

- ❖ Backward recovery
  - Software rejuvenation
  - Operating system re-installation
  - TCP/IP connection resets
  - System reboots and process re-initialisation
  - Software downgrades
- ❖ Forward recovery
  - Automated re-keying procedures ("proactive security")
  - Switching to diminished "safe" mode.
  - Software upgrades
- ❖ Masking
  - Voting mechanisms
  - Fragmentation-Redundancy-Scattering
  - ID Sensor correlation

## Fault Tolerance



# Fault Diagnosis

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- ❖ Core concepts: identification and locations of faults; prerequisite to isolation & reconfiguration
- ❖ **Intrusion diagnosis**, i.e., trying to assess the degree of success of the intruder in terms of system penetration
- ❖ **Vulnerability diagnosis**, i.e., trying to understand the channels through which the intrusion took place so that corrective maintenance can be carried out  
(diagnosis immediate if errors signaled by vulnerability scanner or configuration checker)
- ❖ **Attack diagnosis**, i.e., finding out who or what organisation is responsible for the attack in order that appropriate litigation or retaliation may be initiated


# Fault Isolation

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
- ❖ Core concepts: needed to prevent further errors
- ❖ Interpretation wrt. intrusions
  - Blocking traffic from an intrusion containment domain that is diagnosed as corrupt, by, for example, changing the settings of firewalls or routers
  - Removing a corrupted file from the system
- ❖ Interpretation wrt. root causes (vulnerability/attack)
  - Taking off line software versions with newly-found vulnerabilities
  - Arresting the attacker

# System Reconfiguration

- ❖ Core concepts: redeployment of fault-free resources + corrective maintenance
- ❖ Interpretation wrt. intrusions
  - Change a voting threshold, e.g.,  $3/5 \Rightarrow 2/3$  after 2 corruptions
  - Deployment of countermeasures, inc. probes and traps
- ❖ Corrective maintenance actions
  - Vulnerability removal
    - software revision and upgrade
    - security patches
  - Attacker rehabilitation



# A (very) Simple Example



<http://www.research.ec.org/maftia/>

