



MAFTIA



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LAAS-CNRS

DSN-2001 Special Track on the European
Dependability Initiative
Göteborg, July 2, 2001

Motivation

- ❖ Large network infrastructures, such as the Internet, are vital for citizens to benefit from the Information Society.
- ❖ Development depends on how much the users will 'trust' the services.
- ❖ Such services must be made dependable, in particular w.r.t. malicious attacks by external hackers or by corrupt insiders.

MAFTIA:

Malicious- and Accidental-Fault Tolerance for Internet Applications

- ❖ Systematic investigation of the 'tolerance paradigm' for constructing large-scale dependable distributed applications.
- ❖ Comprehensive approach for tolerating both accidental faults and malicious intrusions in such systems, including intrusions by external hackers and by corrupt insiders.

Contract Details

- ❖ Project Start Date: 1st Jan 2000
- ❖ Duration: 3 years
- ❖ Requested Funding: 2.5 M€
- ❖ No. of person years: 55

Partners

- ❖ **Newcastle University (GB) (coordinator)**
Brian Randell, Robert Stroud
- ❖ **DERA, Malvern (GB)**
Sadie Crees, Tom McCutcheon
- ❖ **IBM, Zurich (CH)**
Christian Cachin, Marc Dacier, Michael Waidner
- ❖ **LAAS-CNRS, Toulouse (F)**
Yves Deswarte, David Powell
- ❖ **Universität des Saarlandes (D)**
André Adeslbach, Birgit Pfitzmann
- ❖ **Universidade de Lisboa (P)**
Nuno Neves, Paulo Veríssimo


Industrial Advisory Board

- ❖ Andrew Izon (North Durham NHS Trust, GB)
- ❖ Jean-Claude Lebraud (Rockwell-Collins, F)
- ❖ Derek Long (CISA Ltd., GB)
- ❖ Joachim Posegga (SAP Systems, D)
- ❖ Carlos Quintas (Easyphone, P)
- ❖ Gilles Trouessin (Ernst & Young Audit, F)
- ❖ Gritta Wolf (Credit Suisse, CH)


Objectives

- ❖ Architectural framework and conceptual model (WP1)
- ❖ Mechanisms and protocols:
 - dependable middleware (WP2)
 - large scale intrusion detection systems (WP3)
 - dependable trusted third parties (WP4)
 - distributed authorization mechanisms (WP5)
- ❖ Validation and assessment techniques (WP6)


The Dependability Tree




The Dependability Tree




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The Dependability Tree




Fault, Error & Failure




Example: Single Event Latchup

SELs (reversible stuck-at faults) may occur because of radiation (e.g., cosmic ray, high energy ions)




Intrusions


Intrusions result from
(at least partially) successful attacks:




Fault, Error & Failure



The Dependability Tree




Fault Tolerance




Error Processing


Backward recovery



Forward recovery




Compensation-based recovery (fault masking)



Error Processing (wrt intrusions)

- ❖ Error (security policy violation) detection
 - + Backward recovery (availability, integrity)
 - + Forward recovery (availability, confidentiality)
- ❖ Intrusion masking
 - **F**ragmentation (confidentiality)
 - **R**edundancy (availability, integrity)
 - **S**cattering

Fault Tolerance



Fault Treatment

❖ Diagnosis

- determine cause of error, i.e., the fault(s)
 - localization
 - nature

❖ Isolation

- prevent new activation

❖ Reconfiguration

- so that fault-free components can provide an adequate, although degraded, service

Fault Treatment (wrt intrusions)

❖ Diagnosis


- Non-malicious or malicious (intrusion)
- Attack (to allow retaliation)
- Vulnerability (to allow removal)

❖ Isolation

- Intrusion (to prevent further penetration)
- Vulnerability (to prevent further intrusion)

❖ Reconfiguration

- Contingency plan to degrade/restore service
 - inc. attack retaliation, vulnerability removal



<http://www.research.ec.org/maftia/>



