

A Self-orchestration Model for Business Collaborations with Verifiable Credentials

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
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Artificial Intelligence and
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**Critical Systems
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
Prelude: Verifiable Credentials

- From the Self-Sovereign Identity movement, the W3C def
- Credential
 - Set of claims made by an issuer
 - Claims are assertions about a subject
- Verifiable Credential
 - Tamper-evident credential
 - With cryptographically verifiable authorship
- Hedging comments
 - ~2023-: a veritable storm of formats, protocols, technologies, regulations, ...
 - The EU is doing its own thing (eIDAS2, QEAA, EUDIW, ...)
 - But this is coming in some way, shape or form for all of us




The W3C “trust triangle” model

- Cryptographic guarantee of:
 - Authenticity: *was issued by issuer*
 - Integrity: *was not tampered with*
 - Revocation status: *is/is not revoked*
- Verifiable w/o asking the issuer
- Interesting SD/privacy options
- Implementation reality varied –
cheqd...EntraID...EUDIW



Possibly (not necessarily) blockchain/DLT



Research direction


- We can use this for far more than “papers, please”
- VCs/VPs: carriers for DAGs of dependent claims
- /fwe have a VDR with (privacy-preserving) revocation
- Connected to ongoing research: decentralized process orchestration

- Note: here we assume DIDs, AnonCreds and DIDComm
- ...but that’s not the point

BPM 2025, BPM Forum, “A Self-orchestration Model for Business Collaborations with Verifiable Process History Credentials”, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-02929-4>

Challenges in cross-org business process execution



- Ensuring that (partially) distrusting parties all “follow the process”
 - Enforcing control flow
 - Establishing irrepudiability
 - ...
- Centralized orchestration/“federated” execution problematic
- Blockchain is the answer!
- ...or is it?



Decentralized “orchestration” approaches




State machine
smart contracts



*Significant body
of work*


Commit & check ZKP
smart contracts




*Petto et al.(BPM 2024)
Toldi, Kocsis (2023)
<https://github.com/ftsrg/zkWF>*

The gap and our goal

State machine
smart contracts



Commit & check ZKP
smart contracts



*Collaboration
self-orchestration*



Our Goal


An orchestration model with cryptographically verifiable execution
But peer-to-peer and confidentiality-preserving

Novel concept: self-orchestration

Each participant carries the process state forward by presenting a cryptographically verifiable process history to the subsequent party.

- Physically AND logically distributed global state
- Shift trust to only the party who has to be trusted
i.e. the one who actually claims something about the state
- *Provenance* of process steps/traces – message passing
- Fine-grained tradeoff b/w confidentiality and integrity
- (For now) worked out for **BPMN collaborations**

Bird's eye view



Core idea

Each pool is its **own orchestrator**. Collaboration “emerges” from **verifiable process histories** passed directly between parties.

Key constructs



Verifiable process history Credentials *VphCs*

- Claim of what happened
 - Pool-internal process trace, etc.
 - VphCs received for each message receive event
- Issued
 - When transition takes place
 - By the last actor
 - To the next actor



Non-invoked Transition Credentials *NiTCs*

- Claim of what *didn't* happen
 - Revoked if path is taken
- Issued
 - Before transition takes place
 - By the target
 - To the initiator

Happy path


Present VCs: You are next, here's why

Citizen chooses
service residence

VphC claims:
message **was** sent

If ok, issue next VphC
and continue


NiTC claims:
message **still may be** sent



Avoiding double spend split brain problem

Problem

How can the Citizen convince the Committee that they **did not** take another **invalid path** (XOR-split)?



Details (and safety) a bit involved.

For (serious) liveness, needs a (linearizable) VDR with atomic revocation check + revoke (wip)

What this buys us – and what it does not


- Positives

- Process orchestration without third party, smart contract, blockchain
- All you need is a *process-oblivious* VDR
- Privacy-preserving (modulo tx pattern analysis)
- Existing representational/carrier standards
- Small step to semantic interpretation (VCs/VPs are knowledge graphs)

- Current downsides

- Guarantees meaningfully weaker than smart contracts
- E.g., malicious recipients
- “Straightforward” only for single malicious actors (multiparty collusion proofs: wip)
- VDR with atomic test and set necessary for strong safety + liveness?
- Protocol finalization in progress
- Optics: it’s just stateless blockchain/Canton/... (it isn’t)

From “we need proofs” to a grave realization



Observation: BPMN's standard operational semantics treats attacks as nonexistent


Thesis: collaboration logics need internal threat analysis

Approach:
Epistemic framing
Co-modeling of
logic + platform + attack primitives

Tool: Tamarin prover (multiset-rewriting + trace property formulas)

Accepted for BPM 2026 Foundations Track, "Trust No Pool: Formal Security Analysis of BPMN Collaborations"

A collaboration logic *is* a security protocol



“Epistemic framing”: Tamarin theories express whether agents can be coerced (Byzantinely) to believe “not true” statements about process state

Definition 2 (Secure and Insecure Execution States). *Given epistemic execution model $\mathcal{M}$ and security properties $\Phi = \{\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_k\}$, a world $w \in W$ is secure iff for every honest participant i and every $\varphi_j \in \Phi$: if $B_i(\varphi_j)$ holds in w , then φ_j holds in w . A world is insecure if some honest participant holds a false security-relevant belief.*

Goal Property		Π_{LC}	Π_{SC}	Π_{VC} (atomic)	Π_{VC} (non-at.)
G1	No-bifurcation	$\times$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\times^\dagger$
G2	Non-repudiation	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
G3	Faithful history	$\times$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\times$
G4	Auth. progression	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
G5	Process progress	B^a	B^a	B^a	B^a
G6a	Value secrecy	$\times$	$\times$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
G6b	Structural secrecy	$\times^a$	—	$\times^a$	$\times^a$
G7	Instance isolation	$\times$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$

Comparing loose coupling, orchestrator smart contracts, VCs-with-atomic-test-and-set-VDR, VCs-with-standard-VDR

Ongoing work

- Final protocol spec + properties + application-independent proofs
 - Privacy-preserving, atomic test-and-set VDRs (scroll.io and Fabric)
 - SDK & wallet framework
-
- Application for agentic collaborations (“data veracity” in EU data spaces)
 - Epistemic (epistemic-alethic?) false claim impact analysis in VC lattices
 - Claim risk mitigation strategies (Laprie et al. transfers – to an extent)