



The past & future of automotive security

Timo van Roermund

IFIP WG 10.4 workshop on Cybersecurity of
Transportation Systems – June 26, ischia


**Do you
recognize
this?**




Looking back at 30 years of automotive security

Use-case specific

Pervasive




Looking back at 30 years of automotive security



Immobilizers

Vehicle theft became a real issue in the early 90s

Car Thefts, Germany



Source: Allianz Zentrum für Technik (AZT)


Directive 95/56/EC
(mandating immobilizers)

How was this achieved?

With semiconductors!

Technology borrowed from the “Schweinepille”

Initially, using ID verification only;
later using cryptography



Unlocking new use cases

Solving problems

Anti-theft system
with transponders



Enhancing user experience


Remote key-entry systems



Keyless entry systems
Keyless engine start/stop



Looking back at 30 years of automotive security



SHE

EVITA HSM

Proposal for standardization		
<div>Hinweis zur Geheimhaltung</div> <div>Dokumentenart</div>		
HIS AK Security	SHE – Secure Hardware Extension Functional Specification	Version 1.0
		\$Rev.: 239 \$
		12.09.2008
Copyright notice This document and its content is copyright of AUDI AG and BMW AG ©, 2008. All rights by reserved. Distribution allowed for all HIS members. You may not, except with express written permission of all HIS members, distribute or commercially exploit the content. Nor may you transmit it or store it in any other website or other form of electronic retrieval system.		



EVITA
E-safety vehicle intrusion protected applications

- Home
- Objectives
- Work plan
- Project partners**
- Fact sheet
- Deliverables
- Publications
- News
- Private area
- Related links
- Contact
- Data Protection Information



31/03/2011

First silicon implementations:

- MPC56 with CSE (2011)**
- AUDO MAX SHE (2011)
- RH850 with ICU (2012)
- MPC57 with HSM (2012)**

Evolution into modern secure enclaves

SHE



- AES-128 (ECB, CBC, CMAC)
- Miyaguchi-Preneel (hash, KDF)
- PRNG (opt. TRNG)
- 10 key slots
- Secure boot, debug

High-performance compute



- Flashless MPUs
- Distributed security architecture
- Protocol offloading
- On-chip resource control & isolation
- Fast secure boot for multicore systems

Future proof



- Upgradeability
- Anti-rollback
- Crypto-agility (in-field)
- Post-quantum crypto
- Long-term support

Increased features ("HSM")




- More cipher modes (CTR, GCM, CCM, ...)
- More algorithms (HMAC, SHA2/3, KDF2, DH, RSA, ECC, ...)
- Larger keys (~256b security strength)
- More key slots (+ key import/export)
- Strict secure boot

Increased resistance, assurance



- Run-time integrity checks
- Remote attestation
- Hardening against FI & SCA
- Third-party security evaluations (SESIP)
- ISO/SAE 21434 compliance

Anchoring trust in secure enclaves



**Secure Enclave
as foundation**

High performance, security
Rich security services


**End-to-end
chain of trust**

Platform security (and keys)
rooted in the Secure Enclave
Chain of trust extends into
the OS and applications

**Trust enforced at the
manufacturing floor**

NXP provides the manufacturing
root-of-trust (MRoT)
And as a service to protect
customer keys using MRoT

Looking back at 30 years of automotive security



Establishing a global cybersecurity community

“In 2015, 14 light-duty vehicle OEMs decided to come together to charter the formation of Auto-ISAC. Our prospectus acknowledged the international nature of the automotive industry and included participation of global international Members. **Auto-ISAC was incorporated in August 2015 and became fully operational in January 2016.**”

Source: <https://automotiveisac.com/faq>



European manufacturers and suppliers join with Auto-ISAC



12 October 2022



The Automotive Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Auto-ISAC) announces a formal collaboration with the European Automobile Manufacturers' Association (ACEA) and the European Association of Automotive Suppliers (CLEPA) to create a central European hub for information sharing on motor vehicle cybersecurity.

Source: <https://www.acea.auto/news/european-manufacturers-suppliers-join-with-auto-isac/>


Since 2022 also in Europe



Bringing 300+ automotive security professionals together!




Looking back at 30 years of automotive security



UWB to prevent modern vehicle theft

Criminals can exploit a vulnerability in keyless entry / start systems using a digital theft technique called the relay attack.



Source: [Thatcham Research - What is keyless entry / start?](#)

“Digitale Funktechnik schützt besser

Mit digitaler Funktechnik können Hersteller ihre Keyless-Modelle sicherer machen. Diese Technik verwendet Computerchips mit **Ultra-Wide-Band-Technik (UWB)** im Schließsystem, mit deren Hilfe aus der Laufzeit der Funksignale präzise die Entfernung des Schlüssels zum Auto ermittelt werden kann. Bei Verwendung der vom ADAC benutzten Funkverlängerung **reagiert das Auto dann nicht mehr.**


Erfreulicherweise hat Jaguar Land Rover als erster Autohersteller seit 2018 diese Technik in neuen Modellen verbaut.“

Source [ADAC - Keyless-Diebstahl: Auch neue Autos sind noch leicht zu knacken](#)

Unlocking new use cases


Solving problems

Relay station attacks




Enhancing user experience

Smart car access using CCC Digital Key™



Further use cases for UWB



Security

Protection against relay station attack



Smart phone access

Truly handsfree access
RSD for phone & fobs



Radar

Passenger detection
Easy trunk access
Intruder alert



Auto positioning

Automated parking (AVP)
EV charging (W/C-EVC)




Car as key

Garage / parking-lot access
Drive through payment




And safety!

Looking back at 30 years of automotive security



Security is no longer an option



EDN

ISO/SAE 21434 auto cybersecurity standard: Dawn of a new era?

Technical requirements for vehicle information security

Technical requirements for vehicle cybersecurity

National Standards Mandatory Coming Soon

GB 44495-2024 – Implementation: Jan. 1, 2026

Road Vehicle Information Security Engineering

Road vehicles—Cybersecurity engineering

National Standards Program Formulate Recommended

20230389-T-339 – equivalent to ISO/SAE 21434:2021




NXP cybersecurity engineering processes are now certified as compliant with the new automotive cybersecurity standard ISO/SAE 21434.



Compliance with ISO/SAE 21434 aligns with the existing NXP principle of security-by-design in automotive applications.


Scope of ISO/SAE 21434

[introductory chapters 1-4 omitted]



A holistic approach is required

NXP's approach to product security, aligned with industry standards & best-practices:



High assurance requires verifiable claims



ISO/SAE 21434


Road vehicles – Cybersecurity engineering



SESIP (EN 17927)

Security Evaluation Standard for IoT Platforms

Achieving **verifiable claims** using SESIP





Reflection

A significant step forward:

- Security is present in every project
- Increasing alignment within the industry
- Networks established




Attention points:


- Establish common baselines & thresholds (threats, attack resistance, assurance)
- Align TARAs
- Avoid wild growth of standards
- Avoid unnecessary 'paperwork'
- Long-term cybersecurity support




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
Contemporary cryptography




The potential **impact** of quantum computers



Broken!




Shor's algorithm
(1994)



(Solution: "double" the key sizes)


"Weakened"



Grover's algorithm
(1996)

Post-quantum crypto

- NXP security experts co-authored six KEM proposals, including Kyber (FIPS 203), Classic McEliece and FrodoKEM (ISO/IEC 18033-2 Amd. 2).
- We work with industry partners, paving the way towards deployment (integration into protocols, systems & infrastructure).




Presentations at escar Europe, 2022 & 2023
Related papers: <https://ia.cr/2023/965> <https://ia.cr/2022/635>



See <https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/19444/611650>



Looking back at 30 years of automotive security




Moving into the software-defined future



Vehicle transformation underway


From hardware-oriented vehicle to **software-defined vehicle**



Static

Best performance when new

Loses value over time



Dynamic, updatable

Performance increases over time

Value increases over time

Software-defined vehicles

Do we need
to **reinvent**
security?



SDV needs at SoC level

On-chip isolation

Software-defined,
hardware-enforced

Enabling function
consolidation within an SoC


Without compromising safety,
security, or (supplier) IP



Remote attestation

Fleet-to-cloud monitoring (VSOC)

ECU-to-ECU monitoring



Conclusions

The automotive ecosystem has come a long way in addressing (cyber)security

Success factors:

- Collaboration within and across ecosystems
- Innovative semiconductor solutions

Both will be essential for future resilience as well





Thank you

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