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Path-Sensitive Code Embedding via Contrastive Learning for Software Vulnerability Detection

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joint work with Xiao Cheng, Guanqin Zhang, Haoyu Wang,

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Contribution

A new **path-sensitive code embedding** utilizing

- precise path-sensitive value-flow analysis
- a pretrained value-flow path encoder via self-supervised contrastive learning

to significantly **boost the performance** and **reduce the training costs** of later **path-based prediction** models to precisely pinpoint vulnerabilities.



Software Vulnerability





Static Vulnerability Detector



Some Static Vulnerability Detectors **User-Defined Specifications**

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1. Rely heavily on user-defined rules and domain knowledge.

2. Have difficulty in finding a wider range of vulnerabilities (e.g., naming issues and incorrect business logic)



Learning-based Vulnerability Detector





Learning-based Vulnerability Detector





Code Embedding

Structure-unaware embedding



Zhen Li, Deqing Zou, Shouhuai Xu, Xinyu Ou, Hai Jin, Sujuan Wang, Zhijun Deng, and Yuyi Zhong. 2018. VulDeePecker: A Deep Learning-Based System for Vulnerability Detection. NDSS (2018). <u>https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2018.23158</u>
 Z. Li, D. Zou, S. Xu, H. Jin, Y. Zhu, and Z. Chen. 2021. SySeVR: A Framework for Using Deep Learning to Detect Software Vulnerabilities. (2021), 1–1. <u>https://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2021.3051525</u>



Code Embedding

Structure-aware embedding



[3] Xiao Cheng, Haoyu Wang, Jiayi Hua, Guoai Xu, and Yulei Sui. 2021. DeepWukong: Statically Detecting Software Vulnerabilities Using Deep Graph Neural Network. ACM Trans. Softw. Eng. Methodol. 30, 3, Article 38 (2021), 33 pages. <u>https://doi.org/10.1145/3436877</u>
[4] Yi Li, Shaohua Wang, and Tien N. Nguyen. 2021. Vulnerability Detection with Fine-Grained Interpretations (FSE '21). ACM, 292–303. <u>https://doi.org/10.1145/3468264.3468597</u>



Limitations

 Existing models are still Insufficient for precise bug detection, because the objective of these models is to produce classification results rather than comprehending the semantics of vulnerabilities, e.g., pinpointing bug triggering paths, which are essential for static bug detection.

GNN: Path-unaware Message-passing

GNN: all pair-wise message passing

$$\boldsymbol{x}_i' = \boldsymbol{W}_1 \boldsymbol{x}_i + \boldsymbol{W}_2 \sum_{j \in N(i)} \boldsymbol{e}_{j,i} \cdot \boldsymbol{x}_j$$

 x_i : feature vector of node i x'_i : updated feature vector of node iN(i): neighbors of node i





Limitations

GNN: Path-unaware Message-passing

GNN does not distinguish feasible/infeasible program dependence paths.





Path-based Code Embedding

• The detection approach needs to work on a precise learning model that can preserve value-flow paths such that we can check the feasibility.



[5] Uri Alon, Meital Zilberstein, Omer Levy, and Eran Yahav. 2019. Code2vec: Learning Distributed Representations of Code. 3, POPL, Article 40 (Jan. 2019), 29 pages. <u>https://doi.org/10.1145/3290353</u>

[6] Yulei Sui, Xiao Cheng, Guanqin Zhang, and HaoyuWang. 2020. Flow2Vec: Value-Flow-Based Precise Code Embedding. Proc. ACM Program. Lang. 4, OOPSLA, Article 233 (Nov. 2020), 27 pages. <u>https://doi.org/10.1145/3428301</u>



Path-based Code Embedding

- Path embedding model
 - Preserve the in-depth semantics of paths
- Path selection strategy
 - Preserve individual feasible paths with discriminative features

































(a) Contrastive Value-Flow Embedding

Source Code

```
1 void msg_q(){
      Inf hd = log_kits("head");
2
      Inf tl = log_kits("tail");
3
4
       •••
      if(FLG){
5
          rebuild_list(&hd);
6
7
          •••
8
      }else{
9
          rebuild_list(&tl);
10
          •••
11
      }
12
      if(FLG){
          set_status(&hd,&tl);
13
14
      }else{
          log_status(&hd, &tl);
15
16
      }
17}
```



(a) Contrastive Value-Flow Embedding

Source Code

1 void msg_q(){ 2 Inf hd = log_kits("head"); Inf tl = log_kits("tail"); 3 4 ••• if(FLG){ 5 rebuild_list(&hd); 6 7 ••• 8 }else{ rebuild_list(&tl); 9 10 ••• } 11 if(FLG){ 12 set_status(&hd,&tl); 13 14 }else{ 15 log_status(&hd, &tl); } 16 17}

API misuse: log_kits \rightarrow rebuild_list \rightarrow set_status

Can cause unexpected behavior



(a) Contrastive Value-Flow Embedding (a) Contrastive Value-Flow Embedding Source Code FLG 1 void msg_q(){ FLG FLG !FLG 2 (2)<u>+</u> 6 15 6 Inf hd = log_kits("head"); Π1 Π3 Inf tl = log_kits("tail"); 3 ••• if(FLG){ π2 π4 rebuild_list(&hd); ... ••• }else{

16 17}

2

3

4

5

6 7

8

9

10

11

12

13 14

15

rebuild_list(&tl);

set_status(&hd,&tl);

log_status(&hd, &tl);

•••

if(FLG){

}else{

}

}



(a) Contrastive Value-Flow Embedding





(a) Contrastive Value-Flow Embedding (a) Contrastive Value-Flow Embedding Source Code 1 void msg_q(){ FLG FLG FLG FLG 2) 2 6 6 15` Inf hd = log_kits("head"); 2 Π3 Inf tl = log_kits("tail"); 3 3) 4 ••• if(FLG){ 5 π2 π4 ••• rebuild_list(&hd); 6 7 ••• 8 }else{ rebuild_list(&tl); 9 10 ••• } 11 if(FLG){ 12 VPE set_status(&hd,&tl); 13 14 }else{ log_status(&hd, &tl); 15 16 } 17} 50 51 VPE π Vπ SN



(a) Contrastive Value-Flow Embedding



Value-Flow Path Encoder (VPE)



(a) Contrastive Value-Flow Embedding



Local Encoding



(a) Contrastive Value-Flow Embedding



Local Encoding



(a) Contrastive Value-Flow Embedding



Local Encoding



(a) Contrastive Value-Flow Embedding





(a) Contrastive Value-Flow Embedding (a) Contrastive Value-Flow Embedding Source Code 1 void msg_q(){ FLG FLG FLG FLG 2 2) 6 6 15 Inf hd = log_kits("head"); 2 Π3 Inf tl = log_kits("tail"); 3 FLG 3 4 ••• if(FLG){ 5 π2 π4 rebuild_list(&hd); ... 6 7 ... Different Contrastive 8 }else{ Representation Dropout rebuild_list(&tl); 9 **ν**π1 Masks 10 ••• νπ1 } 11 **ν**π2 **V**π2 12 if(FLG){ VPE **V**π3 **V**π3⁺ set_status(&hd,&tl); 13 Backward 14 }else{ Propagation **V**π4⁺ log_status(&hd, &tl); 15 2D Embedding Space 16 } 17 }



(a) Contrastive Value-Flow Embedding

$$sim(\mathbf{v}_{\pi_{i}}, \mathbf{v}_{\pi_{j}}) = \frac{\mathbf{v}_{\pi_{i}}^{\top} \mathbf{v}_{\pi_{j}}}{||\mathbf{v}_{\pi_{i}}|| \cdot ||\mathbf{v}_{\pi_{j}}||} \quad loss(\pi_{i}) = -log \frac{exp(sim(\mathbf{v}_{\pi_{i}}, \mathbf{v}_{\pi_{i}}^{+}))}{\sum_{k=1}^{B} exp(sim(\mathbf{v}_{\pi_{i}}, \mathbf{v}_{\pi_{k}}^{+}))} \quad \mathcal{L} = \frac{1}{B} \sum_{i=1}^{B} loss(\pi_{i})$$

Contrastive Value-Flow Embedding Loss





(b) Value-Flow Path Selection





(b) Value-Flow Path Selection



$$guard_{v}(\pi) = \bigwedge_{i=0}^{N-1} \bigvee_{p \in CP(s_{i}, s_{i+1})} \bigwedge_{e \in CE(p)} guard_{e}(e)$$

Value-Flow Guard



(b) Value-Flow Path Selection



$$guard_{v}(\pi) = \bigwedge_{i=0}^{N-1} \bigvee_{p \in CP(s_{i}, s_{i+1})} \bigwedge_{e \in CE(p)} guard_{e}(e)$$

Value-Flow Guard



(c) Detection Model Training





(c) Detection Model Training



$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{V}' &= [\mathbf{h}_1 || ... || \mathbf{h}_h] \mathbf{W}^o \\ \mathbf{h}_i &= Attn(\mathbf{V} \mathbf{W}_i^Q, \mathbf{V} \mathbf{W}_i^K) (\mathbf{V} \mathbf{W}_i^V) \\ Attn(\mathbf{Q}, \mathbf{K}) &= softmax(norm(\mathbf{Q} \mathbf{K}^\top)) \\ \mathbf{M} ulti-head self-attention \end{aligned}$$



(c) Detection Model Training



$$\mathbf{V}' = [\mathbf{h}_1 ||...||\mathbf{h}_h] \mathbf{W}^o$$

$$\mathbf{h}_i = Attn(\mathbf{V} \mathbf{W}_i^Q, \mathbf{V} \mathbf{W}_i^K)(\mathbf{V} \mathbf{W}_i^V)$$

$$Attn(\mathbf{Q}, \mathbf{K}) = softmax(norm(\mathbf{Q} \mathbf{K}^{\top}))$$

Multi-head self-attention

$$v_{\pi_1} \xrightarrow{\alpha_{11}} v_{\pi_1}$$

$$v_{\pi_4} \xrightarrow{\alpha_{41}} v'_{\pi_1}$$

...

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(c) Detection Model Training



$$\alpha_{i}^{c} = \frac{exp(\mathbf{v}_{\pi_{i}}^{\top}\mathbf{a}_{c})}{\sum_{j=1}^{N}exp(\mathbf{v}_{\pi_{j}}^{\top}\mathbf{a}_{c})}$$
$$\mathbf{v}_{c} = \sum_{i=1}^{N}\alpha_{i}^{c}\cdot\mathbf{v}_{\pi_{i}}$$
soft attention

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(c) Detection Model Training



highest attention weights!



Benchmarks



[7] Yunhui Zheng, Saurabh Pujar, Burn Lewis, Luca Buratti, Edward Epstein, Bo Yang, Jim Laredo, Alessandro Morari, and Zhong Su. 2021. D2A: A Dataset Built for AI Based Vulnerability Detection Methods Using Differential Analysis. In Proceedings of the ACM/IEEE 43rd International Conference on Software Engineering: Software Engineering in Practice (ICSE-SEIP). ACM, New York, NY, USA.

[8] Jiahao Fan, Yi Li, Shaohua Wang, and Tien N. Nguyen. 2020. A C/C++ Code Vulnerability Dataset with Code Changes and CVE Summaries. In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Mining Software Repositories (MSR). ACM, 508–512. <u>https://doi.org/10.1145/3379597.3387501</u>

[9] YaQin Zhou, Shangqing Liu, Jingkai Siow, Xiaoning Du, and Yang Liu. 2019. Devign: Effective Vulnerability Identification by Learning Comprehensive Program Semantics via Graph Neural Networks. In Proceedings of the 33rd International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS '19). Curran Associates Inc. <u>https://doi.org/10.5555/3454287.3455202</u>



Benchmarks

Dataset	granularity	# Vulnerable	# Safe	# Total
	Method	21,396	2,194,592	2,215,988
DZA	Slice	105,973	10,983,992	11,089,965
Fan	Method	8,456	142,853	151,309
1 011	Slice	42,527	713,239	717,496
E O	Method	8,923	9,845	18,768
ΙŲ	Slice	45,627	45,627 50,125	
Total	Method	38,775	2,347,290	2,386,065
IUtal	Slice	194,127	11,747,356	11,903,213

Table 1: Labeled sample Distribution.



Comparison with baselines

Table 2: Comparison of method- and slice-level approaches
under informedness (IF), markedness (MK), F1 Score (F1),
Precision (P) and Recall (R). CONTRAFLOW-method/slice de-
notes the evaluation at method- and slice-level respectively.

Model Name	IF (%)	MK (%)	F1 (%)	P (%)	R (%)
VGDETECTOR	31.1	29.3	56.7	52.6	61.4
Devign	30.1	28.8	58.7	54.6	63.4
Reveal	34.2	33.8	63.4	61.5	65.5
CONTRAFLOW-method	60.3	58.2	75.3	71.5	79.4
VulDeePecker	17.3	17.3	52.3	52.2	52.4
SySeVR	24.3	24.2	55.0	54.5	55.4
DeepWukong	48.1	48.4	67.0	67.4	66.5
VulDeeLocator	38.4	38.1	62.0	61.4	62.5
IVDETECT	37.4	37.3	64.1	64.0	64.6
ContraFlow-slice	75.1	72.3	82.8	79.5	86.4



Comparison with baselines

		1	5	10	15	20	AVR@K
	VGDetector	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	17.33	
	Devign	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	17	
	Reveal	N/A	N/A	N/A	13.33	16.17	
L	<u>ContraFlow-method</u>	1	3	4.29	7.33	9.83	
	IVDetect	N/A	4.5	7	9.14	11.7	
	VulDeePecker	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	19	
	SySeVR	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	18.33	
	DeepWukong	1	3.33	6	8.2	13.38	
r	VulDeeLocator	N/A	3.33	6.28	8.4	11.07	
L	ContraFlow-slice	1	3	5.11	7.46	9.88	
		1	5	10	15	20	ASR@K
	VGDetector	N/A	N/A	N/A	14.5	15.5	
	Devign	N/A	N/A	N/A	13.5	15.14	
	Reveal	1	3.33	6.28	8.3	10.38	
Г	ContraFlow-method	1	3	4.63	6.73	8.93	
Ľ	IVDetect	1	3	5	7.3	10.35	
	VulDeePecker	N/A	N/A	N/A	15	18	
	SySeVR	N/A	N/A	N/A	14	17.66	
	DeepWukong	1	3	6.13	8.09	10.14	
	VulDeeLocator	N/A	3.33	6.28	8.4	11 07	
	ContraFlow-slice	1	3	5	7.38	9.76	

Figure 7: Comparison with IVDETECT and VULDEELOCATOR under AVR@k (ASR@k) [48]. AVR@k (ASR@k) represents the average top-k ranking of the correctly predicted vulnerable (safe) samples. N/A means that there is no correctly predicted sample in the top-ranked list.



Comparison with baselines



Figure 9: MIoU and MSF under different LOSs. MSF is the harmonic mean of MSP and MSR.



Comparison with baselines

Table 3: Comparison with IVDETECT and VULDEELOCATOR under SA, MFR and MAR [48]. Statement Accuracy (SA) counts a correct detection if one labeled vulnerable statement is reported. MFR/MAR are the mean value of the first/average ranks of correctly detected statements.

Model Name	1 LOS	SA 4 LOS	(%) 6 LOS	12 LOS	MFR	MAR
VulDeeLocator	1.3	46.7	50.2	54.4	6.9	10.5
IVDETECT	2.1	55.5	59.7	63.5	6.8	9.5
ContraFlow	15.1	73.9	78.2	84.1	2.1	5.7



Ablation Analysis

Table 4: Ablation Analysis Results.CONTRAFLOW-CodeBert/BLSTM/BGRU meansCONTRAFLOW with Code-Bert/BLSTM/BGRU as the value-flow path encoder.

Model Name	IF (%)	MK (%)	F1 (%)	MIoU (%)	MAR
Non-contrastive	61.3	57.9	74.2	40.3	7.8
Random-sampling Path-insensitive	63.2 49.3	59.6 47.2	75.0 68.6	42.9 33.2	7.1 9.8
ContraFlow-CodeBert ContraFlow-BLSTM ContraFlow-BGRU	68.3 56.3 58.3	63.9 54.4 56.2	78.0 73.2 74.2	45.3 42.3 43.1	6.4 7.5 6.9
ContraFlow	75.1	72.3	82.8	50.9	5.7



Thanks! Q&A