



Honeywell


ADELARD
part of nccgroup

SRI International®

UTD
THE UNIVERSITY
OF TEXAS AT DALLAS


DARPA AUTOMATIC RAPID CERTIFICATION OF SOFTWARE (ARCOS)

Consistent Logical Automated Reasoning for Integrated System Software Assurance (CLARISSA) ARCOS Technical Area 3



Disclaimers: This research was developed with funding from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The views, opinions and/or findings expressed are those of the author and should not be interpreted as representing the official views or policies of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.



*Distribution Statement "A": Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
If you have any questions, please contact the DARPA Public Release Center (PRC)*



*Distribution Statement "A": Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
If you have any questions, please contact the DARPA Public Release Center (PRC)*

THEORIES


A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO DEFINING REUSABLE ASSURANCE FRAGMENTS



Distribution Statement "A": Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited. If you have any questions, please contact the DARPA Public Release Center (PRC)

ASCE AUTOMATIC PROLOG EXPORT FOR S(CASP) ENGINE

- Idea is to convert the ASCE network to a logical representation that allows semantic analysis and reasoning about the validity of the case
- Claims are formalized using node properties:
 - Object O satisfies property P in environment E
- The claim structure is exported as a series of Prolog predicates
- It is then possible to evaluate the top-level claim as a Prolog query. When s(CASP) determines that a claim does not hold, we can determine the reason it does not hold by running the *negated query* and looking at the justification tree to see why the counter-claim holds
- Automated Analysis for:
 - Semantic-based analysis of CAE
 - Automatically Identifying Defeaters
 - Assurance Case Synthesis



```

graph TD
    S2((S2)) -- "is a side-claim of" --> A3((A3))
    C3((C3)) -- "is a subclaim of" --> A3
    C4((C4)) -- "is a subclaim of" --> A3
    A3 -- "Supports" --> A5((A5))
    A5 -- "is evidence for" --> E4((E4))
    E4 -- "is evidence for" --> A5
    
```


Answer to whether Claim Holds, Resultant Model and Justification

Distribution Statement "A": Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited. If you have any questions, please contact the DARPA Public Release Center (PRC)

CLARISSA RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS

Novelties in Assurance Case Foundations and Realization in Tools

- ❑ Assurance 2.0 methodology ensures focus on positive claims while simultaneously searching for negative defeaters that invalidate the claim
- ❑ Requirements that the completed assurance case should be indefeasible whereby no credible new information would change the judgment i.e., no unresolved doubts
- ❑ Developed “Theory” as reusable assurance case templates with semantics
- ❑ Integrated Assurance for Safety cases and Security cases
- ❑ Automatically translating assurance case as an equivalent logic program that is amenable to common-sense reasoning
- ❑ Automated checks for consistency and completeness
- ❑ Expert user guided synthesis of assurance case with their defeaters



CLARISSA: Foundations, Tools and Automation Support for Assurance Cases, to appear in DASC 2023 <https://2023.dasconline.org/>

Distribution Statement "A": Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
If you have any questions, please contact the DARPA Public Release Center (PRC)