On Monitoring and Resiliency for Machine-Learning-Based Autonomous Systems

Michael Paulitsch 2021-06-25

IFIP WG 10.4 Talk




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Overview of Two Related Topics

- 1. Resiliency: dependable AI/ML considering platform faults
- 2. Monitoring: safe perception


Accelerators

Dependability as Integral Part of Machine Learning System Optimization





Research Questions?

- Dependability:
 - What are the faults and failure modes to consider?
 - Is dependability really a problem in machine learning?
 - What is the target? 10^{e-9} range for hazards? Failures due to silent data errors?
 - Can we trust AI/ML at all? Diversity arguments? Safety monitoring?
- Cost: overhead runtime and development
 - Can it be nearly free?
 - How to automate?
- Balance: the quest for win-win situation
 - Is there an optimal balance?
 - Monitoring versus generalizability?




From Data to DNNs (CNNs) to Execution





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Common Elements in Intel CNN AI/ML accelerator HW



Accelerators in Practice Tiger Lake and Ice Lake

- Tiger Lake with Intel X^e accelerator
- Ice Lake: Advanced Vector Extensions (AVX)

Introducing 11th Gen Intel[®] Core[™] Processor

New Willow Cove Cores Up to 4 Cores / 8 Threads Up to 4.8GHz

New Converged Chassis Fabric High Bandwidth / Low Latency IP and Core Scalable

New Memory Controller LP4/x-4266 4x32b up to 32GB DDR4-3200 2x64b up to 64GB

1st Integrated Thunderbolt[™] 4 Full 4x DP/USB/PCIe mux on-die Up to 40Gbps bi-directional per port

1st **Integrated PCIe Gen 4 (CPU)** Low Latency, High Bandwidth SSD or Discrete Graphics Direct CPU Attach Up to 96EU – Up to 2x Higher Performance Intel® Deep learning Boost: DP4A for Al New 2x MEDIA Encoders Up to 4K60 10b 4:4:4 Up to 8K30 10b 4:2:0 New 4 x Display Pipes Up to 1 x 8K60 or 4 x 4K60 DP1 4 HBR3, BT 2020

> New Image Processing Unit (IPU6) Video up to 4K90 resolutions (initially 4K30) Still image up to 42 megapixels (initially 27MP)

New GNA 2.0 Enhanced Power Management Autonomous DVFS

New Iris[®] X^e Graphics

For more complete information about performance and benchmark results, visit www.intel.com/11thgen (configuration details in section 3

Low Power, High Performance Intel[®] Iris[®] X^e Graphics



source: 11th Gen Intel Core Processor on intc.com

3rd Gen Intel® Xeon® Scalable Platform

Feature	2nd Gen Intel® Xeon® Scalable Processor (Cascade Lake)	3rd Gen Intel® Xeon® Scalable Processors (Ice Lake)	Notes
Cores per Socket	4-28	8-40	New Sunny Cove architecture
L1/L2/L3 cache per core	32KB/1MB/1.375MB	48KB/1.25MB/1.5MB	Larger caches to enable fast access data
Memory Channels and DIMM Speed	6 Up to 2933	8 Up to 3200	Huge boost in memory bandwidth & support for Intel® Optane™ PMem 200
Processor Interconnect: UPI links, speed	2 or 3, 10.4 GT/s	2 or 3, 11.2 GT/s	Improved bandwidth between processors
PCIe lanes per socket	PCle 3.0, 48 Lanes (x16, x8, x4)	PCIe 4.0, 64 lanes (x16, x8,x4)	2x bandwidth and more PCIe lanes to support new Gen 4 SSD, Ethernet an other adjacencies
Workload Acceleration Instructions	AVX-512 VNNI DDIO	AVX-512, VNNI, DDIO vAES, vPCLMULQDQ, VPMADD52, VBMI, PFR, Crypto, SHA extensions, TME, SGX	Enable new capabilities and speedup performance
Platform Adjacencies		Intel® Optane™ PMem 200 series, Intel® Optane™ P5800X SSD, Intel DC P5510 SSD, Intel E810-C ethernet	
Designed	to Move Faster, St	ore More, Process E	verything
	1		Performance made flexibl


source: 3rd Gen Intel Xeon Processor on intc.com

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Fault / Error / Failures


Hardware Faults – Error - Failures



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High-Performance Computing Safety-critical Applications




System View





High-Performance Computing Safety-critical Applications



System View

Dependability Threats


estimation vulnerability

factor)

Error impact




High-Performance Computing Safety-critical Applications
dependability / reliability target



Error Impact Estimation Influences Hardware Protection



dependability / reliability target




CNN for Image Classification Program Input **ML-Based Program** Output Image mitigation detection ayer. Conv. Layer Conv. Layer Conv. Layer Conv. Layer Conv. Layer FC Layers Error and Output Tensor Flov Input **(**) PyTorch Conv. OpenVINO Tooling Tooling / Middleware Software & Software Platform Platform fanh. oneDNN Primitives oneAP] Error impact vulnerability **OpenVINO** oneAPI estimation factor) machine instructions oneAPI Platform Hardware Platform Hardware Influence Hardware Protection Accelerator / XPU Hardware System View **Dependability Threats Details on Dependability Means**

Dependability Means

Research Question: Mitigation Mechanisms at SW & Tooling Level








Dependability Means

High-Performance Computing Safety-critical Applications dependability / reliability target




Research Question: Resilient Networks

Range Supervision


Example for a simple mitigation approach (joint work with Univ. of British Columbia – Prof. Karthik Pattabiraman)


"Independent" Additional Info?




Ranger – Intuition (I)

Chen et al 2020 ("Ranger") Li et al, 2017 Hong et al, 2019 Hoang et al, 2019 ("ClipAct")









- Insert customizable protection layers ("Ranger layers") for activation range restriction
- Bound extraction from an independent dataset (e.g. training data)
- No retraining of parameters needed

Distribution of accuracy results in 500 epochs:




- Large fault injection space: 1 weight fault in conv layers means fault rate of ~6.7e-8.
- Ranger mitigates the detrimental effect of faults per epoch by eliminating "outliers", and shift bulk towards maximum accuracy



Hoang et al, 2019 ("ClipAct") Geissler et al., 2021 (AlSafety workshop, accepted)

Range restriction alternatives



Corrupted feature map

Goal is to restore the topology of feature maps after a soft error.


Some Ranger Findings


- If **bounds are extracted** from appropriate data, there is almost no reduction of the **baseline accuracy**.
- Impact depends on data representation: For FP32 and the given setup, almost all misclassifications happen due to flip in the MSB.
- Error detection: Strong correlation between out-of-bound events and misclassification. Range supervision provides very high recall (>0.99), precision can be lower (>0.82) due to false positives.
- Error mitigation: Very high, especially Clipper/Backflip. SDC rate is reduced by up to ~50x, to <0.5% in the studied setups.
- Some details @ Geissler et al. Towards a Safety Case for Hardware Fault Tolerance in Convolutional Neural Networks Using Activation Range Supervision, AlSafety WS 2021
- Overhead: practically for free in practical scenarios

Summary & Outlook (Resiliency)

- Dependability: some faults are real (see also recent publications [1, 2])
- Cost: automation and low overhead key to acceptance
- Software and tools play a larger role these days
 - Open source and open languages
 - Libraries oneDNN / oneAPI
 - Cross-architecture languages, compilers, and tools
 - DPC++ = ISO C++ and Khronos SYCL[™] and community extensions
 - OpenVINO[®] tool
 - Researchers can engage in open source push

Special thanks goes to DRL team and Karthik Pattabiraman







Monitoring for Safe Perception

Application and System Level

Safe Perception - Monitoring

- Perception in complex environment with multi-level approaches to improve safety:
- Application-level context (view angles, infrastructure involvement, ...)
- System-level context (diverse space and object representation, sensors, monitors, ...)





Largest Benefits from Infrastructure VS. single automated car



- Additional independent source of perception
- Extended field of view
- Different perception vantage points
- Extended compute and energy envelope



https://www.geospatialworld.net/news/mobileye-join-hands-enable-crowd-sourced-hd-mapping-automated-driving/ https://wtvox.com/fashion-innovation/the-future-of-driving-with-v2v-and-v2i-technology/


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Providentia++

- Image: Second strong

 Image: Second strong
- Basis of the digitalized highway of the future: Real-Time Digital Twin for Smart Highway & Smart City
- Benefits:
 - Real life use case for dependability work




- Test bench for work of Intel Labs (ASMRL & DRL teams)
- Work with IOTG Autonomous Transportation and Infrastructure

Monitor Architecture at Board Level with Application and Application Monitor

How to implement a system that can monitor & recover function :

- requiring significant less complexity
- not decreasing availability of the primary channel



[1] <u>https://www.mobileye.com/responsibility-sensitive-safety/</u>
[2] <u>https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel7/9304518/9304528/09304571.pdf</u>
[3] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2009.14756

Primary

Space

Monitor

Space


Correct

Primary


Space

Error


Dynamic Occupancy Grid



Static Occupied Cells Dynamic Occupied Cells Free Cells Unknown



- Promising results in cluttered & dynamic environments
- Fusion of Lidar [1][2] and Radar sensor[3] information
- Classical algorithm redundancy towards ML algorithms



[1] G. Tanzmeister and D. Wollherr, "Evidential Grid-Based Tracking and Mapping,"


[2] D. Nuss, et al., "A random finite set approach for dynamic occupancy grid maps with real-time application"
 [3] Christopher Diehl, et al. "Radar-based Dynamic Occupancy Grid Mapping and Object Detection", ITSC 2020

Sensor Checks - Position


Objects

- Position
- Velocity
- Dimension

Object Verification



Results: True Positives & False Negatives




ITSC2020 – Towards Online Environment Model Verification | Cornelius Buerkle, Fabian Oboril & Kay-Ulrich Scholl

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
Velocity checks

Sensor checks

Calculate similarity / distance of velocity distribution of each cell in object region with velocity distribution of object



occupancy grid velocity information $V(\zeta)$




object velocity $\Sigma_v(o)$


https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.14756

Objects Position **Velocity**

Dimension

Plausibility checks






False Velocity


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Results – Plausibility checks velocity

Chance of error injection per vehicle and time step: **0.25** Scenario time: Nuscenes clip of ~**125** time steps Time intervals: ~**0.2s**




- False positive rate (FPR) in absence of faults ~ 0.5%
- Measured against **ground truth**, where avg velocity information estimates were added (pos diff over time from last time step).
- Rather insensitive to speed error.



- Increasing speed error faults dv injected. Here, dv
 = 0 means no faults injected
- Recall ~ 0.98 and Precision ~ 0.98 with the given parameters for dv ≥ 3m/s (or ~11km/h)

Addressing Safety at Different Levels ...



DRL Dependability Research Lab

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Summary (Monitoring)

- Monitoring at different levels helps dependability (i.e. safety in this context)
- Application-Level Monitor approaches could help to solve the safety challenge for automated vehicles (AVs)
 - Showed initial realization for monitors of object information based on sensor and plausibility checks
 - Demonstrated feasibility with evaluation results in simulation
- Challenges:
 - Sensor checks rely on quality of dynamic occupancy grid and sensor preprocessing
 - Erroneous cells occupation decrease availability or error detection
 - Diversity arguments and proofs for effectiveness
 - Error detection effectiveness to be further investigated (incl. latent errors)