



# Network Perception

IFIP Meeting  
Jan. 30, 2020  
Robin Berthier






# Agenda

- Background
- **Industry Perspective**
  - Challenges
  - Culture of Resiliency
  - Best Practices
  - Compliance as a stepping stone
  - Pro-active approaches
  - Technology and automation
- **R&D Perspective**
  - Continuous independent network monitoring
  - NP Platform architecture
  - Configuration parsers
  - Network model
  - Topology visualization
  - Path analysis
  - Research roadmap
- Summary

# np Background

- **Univ. of Maryland College Park** — PhD with Michel Cukier
  - **Nfsight**: Netflow visualization platform
  - **Honeybrid**: dynamically-scaling honeypot framework
- **Univ. of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign** — Postdoc with Bill Sanders
  - **Amilyzer**: first IDS for smart meters
  - **NetAPT**: firewall analysis
- **Network Perception** — Co-founder and President
  - **NP-View**: offline network audit
  - **NP-Live**: continuous network device monitoring platform





## Background (cont.)

- Network Perception was launched by a team of researchers and industry experts from the University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign in 2014

**Mission:** to support critical infrastructure in checking the correct implementation of cybersecurity and compliance best practices

- Leveraging 6 years of collaboration with electric utilities
  - Technology developed at TCIPG, an \$18-million cybersecurity research project for the power grid, funded by DHS and DOE
  - Feature set developed through collaboration with users and auditors
  - 100+ deployments in the US



# INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE



# Challenges



20+ billion connected devices in 2020

30% yearly increase

53,000 confirmed security incidents in 2018

28% insider job

○ 2017+

WannaCry ransomware cyber attack affecting ICS (\$4B loss)

○ 2018


Compromise of M.E.Doc by NotPetya: Maersk network down



# Challenges

○ **2018**  
US Navy information  
compromised via contractors

○ **2018**  
VPN Filter malware targeting critical  
infrastructure in **Ukraine**



○ **2017+**  
WannaCry ransomware cyber  
attack affecting ICS (\$4B loss)

○ **2018**  
Compromise of M.E.Doc by  
NotPetya: Maersk network down

Attack surface  
keeps increasing  
while security threats  
keep evolving



# EVOLUTION OF NETWORK SECURITY



1 PROTECTION



2 DETECTION



3 REGULATION



4 BEST PRACTICES

# EVOLUTION OF NETWORK SECURITY



1 PROTECTION



2 DETECTION



3 REGULATION



4 BEST PRACTICES

Towards a Culture of Resilience: Compliance + Best Practices

At or above standards

24/7: no gap in execution

Adaptive to changes

Visible and measurable



# EVOLUTION OF NETWORK SECURITY



1 PROTECTION



2 DETECTION



3 REGULATION



4 BEST PRACTICES

## Towards a Culture of Resilience: Compliance + Best Practices

At or above standards

24/7: no gap in execution

Adaptive to changes

Visible and measurable

Auditors

Cybersecurity


Governance, Risk & Compliance

Network Management: IT



# The Alignment Challenge




*“Ability to continuously deliver the intended outcome despite adverse cyber events”*





# Best Practices


*“Procedure that has been shown by **research and experience** to produce **optimal results** and that is established or proposed as a **standard** suitable for widespread adoption”*





# The US Electric Industry

## U.S. electric power regions




**Note:** A balancing authority ensures, in real time, that power system demand and supply are finely balanced.

Source: <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=27152>



# The US Electric Industry (cont.)




Balancing Authority	105
Distribution Provider	388
Generation Owner	972
Generation Operator	921
Planning Authority / Planning Coordinator	71
Reliability Coordinator	16
Resource Planner	168
Response Sharing Group	15
Transmission Owner	326
Transmission Operator	175
Transmission Provider	200
Transmission Service Provider	78

**1,454**  
 registered  
 entities

# NERC Regulation

- **FERC:** Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
  - Energy Policy Act of 2005
- **NERC:** North American Electric Reliability Corporation
  - Critical Infrastructure Protection reliability standards enforced since 2008
  - Up to \$1M / day of violation







# NERC Regulation (cont.)

<a href="#"><u>CIP-002-5.1a</u></a>	Cyber Security - BES Cyber System Categorization
<a href="#"><u>CIP-003-7</u></a>	Cyber Security - Security Management Controls
<a href="#"><u>CIP-004-6</u></a>	Cyber Security - Personnel & Training
<a href="#"><u>CIP-005-5</u></a>	Cyber Security - Electronic Security Perimeter(s)
<a href="#"><u>CIP-006-6</u></a>	Cyber Security - Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems
<a href="#"><u>CIP-007-6</u></a>	Cyber Security - System Security Management
<a href="#"><u>CIP-008-5</u></a>	Cyber Security - Incident Reporting and Response Planning
<a href="#"><u>CIP-009-6</u></a>	Cyber Security - Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems
<a href="#"><u>CIP-010-2</u></a>	Cyber Security - Configuration Change Management and Vuln. Assessments
<a href="#"><u>CIP-011-2</u></a>	Cyber Security - Information Protection
<a href="#"><u>CIP-014-2</u></a>	Physical Security



# Compliance as a Steppingstone

	<b>Compliance</b>	<b>Best Practices</b>
<b>Asset inventory</b>	<b>CIP-002-5:</b> BES Cyber System Categorization	Expand inventory to include all IT/OT assets
<b>Network access policy</b>	<b>CIP-003-7:</b> Security Management Controls <b>CIP-005-5:</b> Electronic Security Perimeters	Adopt NIST 800-41 guideline on network policy for every firewall Review network segmentation across all business units
<b>Change tracking</b>	<b>CIP-010-2:</b> Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments	Include mandatory quality control through independent review for every changes



# Mapping Compliance with Security Controls

NERC CIP Version 5	Critical Security Controls
<b>CIP-002-5 BES Cyber System Categorization</b>	
R1: Attachment 1 CIP-002-5 Incorporates the “Bright Line Criteria” to classify BES Assets as Low, Medium, or High. Called BES Cyber Systems consolidating CAs and CCAs	Control 1: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Device Control 2: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software Control 4: Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation
R2: BES Cyber System Lists must be reviewed and approved every 15 calendar months	
<b>CIP-003-5 Security Management Controls</b>	
R1: Cyber Security Policies approved for Medium and High Impact BES Cyber Systems by CIP Senior Manager every 15 calendar months. Cyber Security Policies for Medium and High Impact BES Cyber Systems must address CIP-004-CIP-011 (CIP-010 Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments, CIP-011 Information Protection) as well as Declaring and Responding to CIP Exceptional Circumstances	Critical Control 15: Controlled Access based on need to know Critical Control 3: Secure Configurations for hardware and software on mobile devices, laptops, workstations, and servers Critical Control 4: Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation Critical Control 10: Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Routers, and Switches Critical Control 18: Incident Response and Management
R2: Cyber Security Policies approved for Low Impact Assets by CIP Senior Manager every 15 Calendar Months Cyber Security Policies for low impact assets must include Cyber Security Awareness, Physical Security Controls, Electronic Access Controls for external routable protocol connections and dial-up connectivity and incident response to Cyber Security Incident. An inventory, list, or discrete identification of low impact BES Cyber Systems or their BES Cyber Assets is not required	Critical Control 15: Controlled Access based on need to know Critical Control 4: Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation Critical Control 10: Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Routers, and Switches Critical Control 18: Incident Response and Management Critical Control 13: Boundary Defense
R3: Identify a CIP Senior Manager and document any change within 30 calendar days of the change	
R4: CIP Senior Manager must document any delegates	

Source: <https://www.sans.org/media/critical-security-controls/nerc-cip-mapping-sans20-csc.pdf>



# Compliance Toolset



## Risk Assessment & Visibility



## Security Ratings



## Pen Testing & Breach Simulation



## GRC



## Security Awareness & Training






# Understanding Toolset Scope

## Pro-active Solutions

## Reactive Solutions





# Technology Vetting Checklist

At or above  
standards

24/7: no gap in  
execution

Adaptive to  
changes

Visible and  
measurable

- Industry standards and third-party integration supported
- Value proposition aligned with resiliency objectives
- Leverages automation and smart workflows for continuous compliance
- User experience validated by all stakeholders
- Reports are actionable and include relevant measurements



# Industry Perspective: Summary

- Government and organizations are moving towards a **culture of resilience** in which risk-based approaches are the norm.
- Cybersecurity is everyone's responsibility. Compliance can be a **pro-active steppingstone** towards improving resiliency.
- Best practices should be **independent, measurable, and usable**. Understanding the barriers to adoption is key to succeed.



# R&D PERSPECTIVE





“If you really want to protect your network,  
you really have to know your network”

Rob Joyce - Chief, NSA TAO [Tailored Access Operation]





# Why is this still a challenge?


- Growing network complexity
- Variety of proprietary firewall technologies requiring expert knowledge
- Network devices prone to misconfiguration
- Time-consuming tasks to manually review configurations and to ensure compliance with best practices and regulatory standards
- Question keeping practitioners up at night: “Did we miss anything?”



# Network Device Change Management


- **Objectives:**

- Document implementation and adherence to best practices:
  - Security reports and internal processes
  - Compliance reports
- Leverage automation to reduce likelihood of human errors





# Separation of Duties





# Being Pro-Active

## Core Challenges

At or above standards

24/7: no gap in execution

Adaptive to changes

Visible and measurable

## Approach

Process & Model-driven  
Benchmarks

Continuous Monitoring


Automated Workflow

Highly Usable Toolset





# Configuration Monitoring Workflow



Standalone



Server




Cloud



Manufacturer	Type	Configuration files needed
<b>Alcatel Lucent</b>	Omniswitch	<code>save [filename]</code>
<b>Amazon Web Service</b>	EC2	<code>aws ec2 describe-security-groups</code> <code>aws ec2 describe-instances</code>
<b>Azure Cloud</b>		Azure Cloud Shell (PowerShell 2.1.0): <code>Export-AzResourceGroup</code>
<b>Check Point</b>	-	R77: <code>/etc/fw/conf/objects_5_0.C</code> <code>/etc/fw/conf/rulebases_5_0.fws</code> R80: <i>see instructions below table</i>
<b>Cisco</b>	Firewall, Router, Switch	<code>show running-config</code>
<b>Enterasys</b>	-	<code>save config</code>
<b>Extreme</b>	Switch	<code>save configuration [primary , secondary , existing-config , new- config]</code> (check which config is running with <code>use configuration</code> )
<b>FreeBSD (PF)</b>	-	ruleset: <code>cat /etc/pf.conf</code> interfaces: <code>ifconfig -a</code>
<b>Fortinet</b>	-	<code>show full-configuration</code>
<b>Hirschmann</b>	Eagle One	<code>copy config running-config nv [profile_name]</code>



# Configuration Parsers








# Topology Visualization

Implemented in  
NetworkX, D3js, and  
Angularjs






# Path Analysis


## Objectives:

- “Compile” ruleset into paths
- Check network segmentation





# Steppingstone Access Map





# Vulnerability Exposure

- Network scanner import
  - Nmap
  - Nessus
  - Nexpose
- Security advisories import from device manufacturers

ADVISORY	IMPACT	CVE	LAST UPDATED	VERSION
<input type="text" value="Search Advisory Name"/>	<i>All</i>	<input type="text" value="Search CVE"/>	<i>Most Recent</i>	

		Cisco Small Business Switches Denial of Service Vulnerability	High	CVE-2020-3147	2020 Jan 29	1.0
		Cisco Small Business Switches Information Disclosure Vulnerability	High	CVE-2019-15993	2020 Jan 29	1.0
		Cisco Small Business Smart and Managed Switches Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerability	High	CVE-2019-12636	2020 Jan 27	2.0
		Cisco Webex Meetings Suite and Cisco Webex Meetings Online Unauthenticated Meeting Join Vulnerability	High	CVE-2020-3142	2020 Jan 24	1.1



# Automated Report

• <b>Executive Summary</b>	Findings and recommendations		
• <b>Ruleset Check</b>	E.g., invalid interfaces		
– Misconfigurations	Empty and unused groups		
– Object groups	Unused rules, missing justifications	CIP-003 R1.1.3	CIP-005 R1.3
– Access rules	Missing hostnames		
– Assets			
• <b>Risks Assessment</b>	Overly permissive rules, risky ports	CIP-003 R1.1.3	CIP-005 R1.3
• <b>Path Analysis</b>			
– Network topology	Network zones and criticality		CIP-005 R1.1
– Connectivity matrix	Network segmentation	CIP-003 R1.1.3	R1.2
– Intermediate systems	Jump hosts		R2.1
– Explicit deny by default	Ensure white listing approach		R1.3
• <b>Next Steps</b>			



# Ruleset Check

- Misconfigurations
  - Duplicate or invalid IP addresses
  - Invalid network zones
  - Invalid interface configuration (e.g., unused security levels)
  - Rules for equipment no longer in service
- Object groups
  - Empty object groups
  - Unused object groups
- Access rules
  - Unused rules (e.g., ACL not bound to an interface)
  - Missing rule descriptions
- Assets
  - Missing hostnames
  - Incomplete asset inventory



# Continuous Monitoring

**Objective: 24/7 alignment with best practices and regulations**

Change Tracking



2019-04-26: 15 change events



Search



timestamp	action	device	description
2019-04-26 12:54:39	<b>workspace analysis updated</b>	328 paths total	analysis completed successfully
2019-04-26 12:54:30	<b>⌚ topology updated</b>	6 devices	2 nodes added, 0 node removed
2019-04-26 12:54:27	<b>successful import</b>	Primary-EMS.txt	Ruleset diff analysis: 2 lines added, 1 line removed
2019-04-26 12:54:27	<b>device path information</b>	PrimaryEMS	35 paths added affecting 26 assets and 8 services, 0 path removed
2019-04-26 12:54:24	<b>device path information</b>	Remote-A	7 paths added affecting 7 assets and 1 service, 0 path removed
2019-04-26 12:54:24	<b>successful import</b>	Remote-A.txt	device config file imported and successfully parsed (initial version, no diff available).

# np Policy Management

- Library of policy requirements:
  - Logic implemented using YARA
  - Pattern matching available for CONFIG, RULE, PATH, PARSER LOGS

Risk Policies ✕

## Default Parser Policy

- ✓ Unnecessary EIGRP network
- ✓ Broadcast traffic permissions
- ✓ Traffic to multicast group
- ✓ Empty field
- ✓ Unused field
- ✓ Mixed any and not any
- ✓ Unassigned interface
- ✓ Missing interfaces
- ✓ Rule following schedule

**Requirement name:**

Missing interfaces

**Description:**

Check if there are any zones missing interfaces

**Author:**

default

**Criticality:**

Low

**Category:**

Parser

**Logic:**

[? How to write](#)

```
PARSER contains "Zone(s) missing interfaces"
```



# np Policy Management

- Risk assessment grading:

## firewall Distribution

Vendor: **cisco 8.4**

Category: 

Criticality: **medium**  



1 CONFIGURATION FILE VERSION 

**B** RISK ASSESSMENT GRADING 

OK CONNECTIVITY MATRIX & BASELINE 











3 RISKS & WARNINGS 

10 ACCESS RULES 

34 GROUPS 

3 ROUTES

10 INTERFACES

	NAME	ADDRESS	TYPE	SECURITY
	CORP	172.30.0.190	standard	0
	inside	172.30.90.1	standard	100
	EMSDMZ	172.30.91.1	standard	90
	EMSDEV	172.30.92.1	standard	95
	Management0/0	unknown	standard	-1
	EMSBKP	172.30.70.190	standard	50
	Cellular0	unknown	standard	51
	GigabitEthernet1/1	unknown	standard	-1
	GigabitEthernet1/2	172.30.90.190	standard	-1
	GigabitEthernet1/3	unknown	standard	-1



# Summary

- A **culture of resilience** is changing the way critical infrastructures are organized and brings more resources to dedicated security and compliance groups
- Regulation is now leveraged as a **steppingstone** towards best practices
- Dedicated security and compliance teams are growing and need **highly-usable solutions** to address the increasing complexity of today's networks
- Usability and automation are still critically needed to improve **network situational awareness** in industrial sectors



# Network Perception

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