

# Software Dependability:

## How Far are We?

Karama Kanoun

LAAS-CNRS

Dependability of Computing Systems: Memories and Future  
15-16 April 2010 - Toulouse - France

# Why Software Dependability Assessment?

## ☞ User / customer

- Confidence in the product
- Acceptable failure rate

## ☞ Developer / Supplier

- During production
  - ☞ Reduce # faults (zero defect)
  - ☞ Optimize development
  - ☞ Increase operational dependability
- During operation
  - ☞ Maintenance planning
- Long term
  - ☞ Improve software dependability of next generations


# Approaches to Software Dependability Assessment

- ☞ Assessment based on software characteristics
  - Language, complexity metrics, application domain, ...
- ☞ Assessment based on measurements
  - Assessment of the product
  - Assessment of the production process
- ☞ Assessment based on controlled experiments
  - Ad hoc vs standardised → benchmarking

# Outline of the Presentation


- ☞ Assessment based on software characteristics
  - Language, complexity metrics, application domain, ...
- ☞ Assessment based on measurements
  - Assessment of the product
  - Assessment of the production process
- ☞ Assessment based on controlled experiments
  - Ad hoc vs standardized → benchmarking

# Dependability Measures?



# Assessment Based on Measurements

Software Process Improvement (SPI)



# Benefits from SPI Programmes

- ☞ **AT&T**(quality program):

  - Customer reported problems divided by 10

  - Maintenance program divided by 10

  - System test interval divided by 2

  - New product introduction interval divided by 3

- ☞ **IBM** (defect prevention approach):

  - Fault density divided by 2 with an increase of 0.5 % of the product resources

- ☞ **Motorola** (Arlington Heights), mix of methods:

  - Fault density reduction = 50% within 3.5 years

- ☞ **Raytheon** (Electronic Systems), CMM:


  - Rework cost divided by 2 after two years of experience

  - Productivity increase = 190%


  - Product quality: multiplied by 4

# Assessment Based on Measurements

## Data Collection




## Data Processing






# Why Trend Analysis?




# Example: Electronic Switching System

Failure intensity




# Electronic Switching System (Cont.)

Cumulative number of failures



# Electronic Switching System (Cont.)

Cumulative number of failures → Hyperexponential model application  
⇒ maintenance planning




Observed # failures [20-32] = 33

Predicted # failures [21-32] = 37

# Electronic Switching System (Cont.)

Failure intensity and failure rate in operation  
(for an average system)




# Other Example: Operating System

## Observed Time to Failure during operation

Mean  
Time to Failure



Trend evolution  
= stable dependability



# Validity of Results

| Early Validation   | End of Validation  | Operation   |
|--|--|---|
| <p>☞ Trend analysis<br/>→ development<br/>follow-up</p> <p><del>Assessment</del></p> | <p>☞ Trend analysis<br/>+<br/>☞ Assessment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• operational profile</li> <li>• enough data</li> </ul> <p>☞ Limits: <math>10^{-3}/h</math> - <math>10^{-4}/h</math></p> | <p>☞ Trend analysis<br/>+<br/>☞ Assessment</p> <p><b>High relevance</b></p> <p>Examples:</p> <p>E10-B (Alcatel ESS):<br/>1400 systems, 3 years<br/><math>\lambda = 5 \cdot 10^{-6}/h</math><br/><math>\lambda_c = 10^{-7}/h</math></p> <p>Nuclear I&amp;C systems:<br/>8000 systems, 4 years<br/><math>\lambda: 3 \cdot 10^{-7}/h \rightarrow 10^{-7}/h</math><br/><math>\lambda_c = 4 \cdot 10^{-8}/h</math></p> |

# Research Gaps


- ☞ Applicability to safety critical systems
  - During development
- ☞ Applicability to new classes of systems
  - Service oriented systems
  - Adaptive and dynamic software systems ⇒ on-line assessment
- ☞ Industry implication
  - Confidentiality ⇒ real-life data
  - Cost (perceptible overhead, invisible immediate benefits)
- ☞ Accumulation of experience ⇒ software process improvement
  - ⇒ assessment of the software process
- ☞ Case of Off-The-Shelf software?



# Dependability Benchmarking


## Off-The-Shelf software

- ☞ No information available from software development
- ☞ Evaluation based on controlled experimentation




**Reproducibility, repeatability, portability, representativeness, acceptable cost**

# Benchmarks of Operating Systems



- ☞ Limited knowledge: functional description
  - ☞ Limited accessibility and observability
- ⇒ **Black-box approach** ⇒ **robustness benchmark**


# Robustness Benchmarks




Faults = corrupted system calls

# OS Response Time to Faults in the Application

## Windows




## Linux




- Without corruption
- In the presence of corrupted system calls

# Mean Restart Time

## Windows




## Linux




- Without corruption
- In the presence of corrupted system calls

# Detailed Restart Time


## Windows XP



## Linux 2.2.26



## More on Windows family



# Benchmark Characteristics

- ☞ A benchmark should not replace software test and validation
- ☞ Non-intrusiveness  $\Rightarrow$  robustness benchmarks  
(faults injected outside the benchmark target)
- ☞ Make use of available inputs and outputs  $\rightarrow$  impact on measures
- ☞ Balance between cost and degree of confidence
- ☞ # dependability benchmark measures  $>$   
# performance benchmark measures  
 $\Rightarrow$  Lack of maturity



# Maturity

## 👉 Dependability benchmarks


- Infancy
- Isolated work
- Not explicitly addressed
- Acceptability?

## 👉 Performance benchmarks

- Mature domain
- Cooperative work
- Integrated to system development
- Accepted by all actors for competitive system comparison

“Ad hoc” benchmarks

“Competition” benchmarks



Ultimate objective:  
more reliable software, faster, and cheaper!

# Software Dependability:

## How Far are We?

Karama Kanoun

The logo for LAAS-CNRS, featuring the text "LAAS-CNRS" in a bold, sans-serif font. The text is centered between two horizontal lines: a red line on top and a yellow line on the bottom.

LAAS-CNRS

Dependability of Computing Systems: Memories and Future  
15-16 April 2010 - Toulouse - France