## Sydney



# Red Belly Snake





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## Roadmap

- Context: Blockchain
- Problem: Man-in-the-Middle Attack
- Solution: Blockchain consensus
- Illustration: Red Belly Blockchain
- Experimental Results

### What is a blockchain?



## Blockchain (con't)





# Blockchain (con't)



# Blockchain (con't)

blockchain depth = i+k



We say that a transaction commits when it is in a decided block [NCA'16]

# Attacking Ethereum [SRDS'18]





# 3. Multiple Spending



# Attacking Ethereum (con't)

- Ethereum v1.5
  [Woo'15] (k=11 blocks for commit)
- 10 largest mining pools
- Set CPU power using cgroup to adjust quantum



BGP-hijacking attack of various durations (VMs with OpenStack)

# Attacking Ethereum (con't)



#### Blockchain Consensus

### Unforkable blockchain

blockchain depth = i+k



We say that a transaction commits when it is in a decided block [NCA'16]

### Model

- Distributed system: n processes  $\Leftarrow$  but additional processes can issue transactions and read the blockchain

# Byzantine Consensus?

Each correct process invokes propose(v) with its value v and decides the returned value such that:



Agreement: no two correct processes decide differently



Termination: every correct process decides



Validity: the decided value is proposed by a correct process

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#### Blockchain Consensus [AlgoTel'17]

Provided an application-specific valid() predicate, each correct process invokes propose(v) and decides the returned value such that:



Agreement: no two correct processes decide differently



Termination: every correct process decides



Validity: the decided value satisfies the predicate valid() and if all correct propose a valid v, they decide v.

All nodes communicate through TCP + SSL



Certificates are given in blocks

The genesis block also contains a list of n participants



...that run a leaderless blockchain consensus alg.[CGLR'17]

External nodes (clients) access the blockchain through these participants

A tx is committed if t+1 participants say so.

This is a community blockchain [Blockchain'18]



Not every node decides the block at **every** index, but every node decides upon a block at **some** index

This is a community blockchain [Blockchain'18] The n nodes running the consensus...

are regularly changed: n, n', n''... but t'<n'/3, t''<n''/3...

This is a community blockchain [Blockchain'18] These nodes form a community...



...listed in special blocks, and deciding upon next transaction blocks

Signature verification uses ECDSA and is sharded



#### Results

#### Benchmark

- Initiator sends a message to n nodes to start (with same genesis block)
- Each node connects to each other through SSL/TLS
- Average over multiple instances of consensus in which:
  - Each of the n nodes proposes a block of 10K txs
  - Each node spawns n instances of RBbcast and BBC
  - Each tx is a 350-byte UTXO transaction
  - Each transaction gets validated by t+1≤k≤2t+1 nodes
  - Each node stores the blockchain locally

### Scalability



### Latency

Amazon EC2 c4 instances, 18 HT cores, 60 GiB mem, 2 Gbps, t=6









c4 instances, 4 vCPU, 7.5 GiB, 750 Mbps, n=140



- <u>PBFT</u>: State-of-the-art Byzantine consensus implementation [OSDI'02]. It relies on a leader and decides on one of the proposed value.
- <u>HBBFT</u>: The Honey Badger BFT [CCS'16] is based on the binary randomized consensus algorithm [PODC'14], a consensus reduction [PODC'94] and uses erasure codes.
- <u>DBFT</u>: The Democratic BFT [CGLR17] we introduced for RBBC. It is leader-less, does not exchange erasure codes but block hashes.

#### c4 instances, 4 vCPU, 7.5 GiB, 750 Mbps, n=140, t=46



Block size (#transactions)

c4 instances, 4 vCPU, 7.5 GiB, 750 Mbps, n=140, t=46



c4 instances, 4 vCPU, 7.5 GiB, 750 Mbps, n=140, t=46



Block size (#transactions)

### Larger Scale



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# Larger Scale

#replicas	#requesters	Valid tx/sec	Async write Latency	Latency	Valid tx/ block	Invalid tx/block
1000	8400	30684	238ms	3103ms	95407	378

#### Conclusion

- We propose the Red Belly Blockchain
  - <u>Secure</u>: does not fork
  - <u>Efficient</u>: commits up to 660,000 TPS
  - <u>Scale</u> to 1000 geodistributed replicas with a 3 second latency
  - <u>Dynamic</u>: A community blockchain that avoids wastes

#### Future Work

- Deploy community nodes under the control of distinct jurisdictions and representative of different parts of the population
- We are implementing incentives (identify and punish misbehaviors) for a more realistic model (rational instead of correct/ Byzantine)

#### References

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### See you in Sydney

![](_page_48_Picture_1.jpeg)

#### More information

#### https://redbellyblockchain.io