

Probabilistic Analysis of Safe and Unsafe Disagreement in Leader Election Protocols for Virtual Traffic Lights

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


What is a Virtual Traffic Light (VTL)?

- A Virtual Traffic Light is a self-organizing traffic control system.
- It allows road vehicles passing an intersection to implement the function of a traffic light without a roadside installation or access to a wireless internet connection.
- Relies entirely on wireless vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication.
- No central control



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Challenges in designing Leader Election Protocols for VTL:s

- It is not feasible to assume an upper bound on the number of messages that can be lost during the execution of a leader election protocol over a V2V wireless network.
- Consensus cannot be guaranteed in presence of a "high" number of message losses.
 - Impossibility result by Santoro & Widmayer, 1989
- The number of participating nodes and their identities is initially unknown to all nodes => a node (vehicle) may have an incorrect view of the system size n.



Assumptions

- Fault model: receive omissions
 - Message losses on the receiver side
 - Constant failure probability of all message receptions
- System model: synchronous distributed system
 - Round based communication
 - The number of communication rounds is *fixed at design time*
 - Each node broadcasts one message per round
- A node (vehicle) either *selects a leader* or *aborts*
- A node may have an incorrect view of the system size n.



Three protocols


- Whether a node (vehicle) will select a leader or abort is determined by a decision criterion executed as the final step in each instance of the protocol.
- We constructed three protocols with different decision criterions, which we denote as
 - Optimistic
 - Pessimistic
 - Moderately pessimistic
- All three protocols rely on a *potentially unreliable oracle* to determine the system size *n*.



Possible system-wide outcomes

- Agreement on a leader all nodes select the same leader.
- Agreement on abort all nodes decide to abort due to insufficient information (too many messages have been lost).
- Disagreement some nodes decide to abort and others decide on a leader.
- We can categorize disagreement in two main classes:
 - Safe disagreement some nodes decides to abort and other nodes decide on *the same leader*.
 - Unsafe disagreement at least two nodes decide on different leaders.

No. of nodes (*n*) = 3, 4, 6, R=2, receive omissions, perfect oracles => no unsafe disagreement



n = no. of nodes (cluster leaders)

 \mathbf{R} = no. of communication rounds

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
Q = probability of message lost at receiver (receive omissions)

Perfect oracles = all nodes have the correct view of the system size *n*.

OP = optimistic decision criterion
PS = pessimistic decision criterion
MP = moderately pessimistic decision criterion



n = 4 (true value), all oracles incorrectly assume a system size of 2.



n = no. of nodes (cluster leaders)

- **R** = no. of communication rounds
- **Q** = probability of message lost at receiver (receive omissions)

Non-perfect oracles = not all nodes have the correct view of the system size *n*.



Conclusions

- We introduced the concepts of safe and unsafe disagreement in V2V wireless networks.
- Unsafe disagreement does not occur *if all nodes have a correct view* of the system size *n* (= perfect oracles).
- Unsafe disagreement does not occur *if one or more* oracles overestimate and no oracle underestimate the size of the system.
- Unsafe disagreement occurs only if one or more oracles underestimate the size of the system.