

# An Exercise in Applying Daubert Evaluation Criteria to Security Fuzz Testing

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# Overview

- Rule 702 & Daubert criteria for US Federal Courts
  - Specifically intended to reject “junk science”
- How does Fuzz Testing measure up?
  - This is just an example; feel free to follow along with your favorite technique in mind
- What are the implications for security?
  - (And other related properties?)

# Rule 702: Testimony By Experts

- Expert witness
  - Qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
  - In US, generally hired by parties to a lawsuit
    - Unsurprisingly, opposing experts may disagree
- Testimony acceptable if all of:
  - Must assist “trier of fact” in understanding
  - Based on sufficient facts or data
  - Product of reliable principles & methods
  - Witness has reliably applied principles and methods to the facts of the case

# Daubert Criteria

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)

1. Theory or technique has been tested
  2. Subject to peer review and publication
  3. What is known/potential error rate?
  4. Standards controlling method's operation
  5. Widespread scientific community acceptance
- Judge is gate-keeper for testimony validity
    - Flexible application; not all criteria need be met

# Hypothetical Situation

- Company C being sued for insecure system
  - E.g., class action suit by credit card customers
  - Data released, but no “smoking gun” for how it happened
    - Plaintiffs can’t name a concrete bug/vulnerability
- Defense expert D has a report that says:
  - “System S is secure because fuzz testing found no exploitable vulnerabilities”
- Should D be allowed to testify?
  - Or is D using “junk science”?

# *Subject To Peer Review and Publication*

- Typical fuzz testing papers:
  - We fuzz tested (or robustness tested, fault injected, etc.) and...
  - Found ways to crash the software
- But, need something more...
  - Find papers that did manual analysis to show that fuzz testing found exploitable vulnerabilities

## *Theory or Technique Has Been Tested*

- Is the theory falsifiable (scientific method)?
  - Or refutable; or testable
- A typical fuzzing paper:
  - We found something with fuzz testing
  - Further analysis showed it was exploitable
- But, Expert D's hypothesis is:
  - “Finding nothing with fuzzing means the system is secure”
  - What kind of publication does D need to find?

# An Aside: “Dauberting” an Expert

- Plaintiffs (the class action lawyers) can challenge Defendant expert opinion admissibility
  - They file a report explaining why opinion is junk science
  - Judge decides based on Daubert criteria
  - Can exclude some or all of report
    - Excluding a report on either side can essentially terminate the case (summary judgment for prevailing side)
- What academic paper are Plaintiffs looking for?
  - What is their key argument you’d pursue if you were helping them?

# *What Is Known/Potential Error Rate?*

- Origins in applying statistical analysis
  - E.g., “toxic tort” such as exposure causing cancer
- What are the chances the analysis is correct?
  - US civil standard is “more likely than not” = 51%
  - Some flaws in analysis “go to weight, not admissability”
- How reliable is fuzzing at finding security vulnerabilities?
  - In absence of further analysis – just fuzzing results
  - If you find nothing, does that correlate with security?
  - If you find something, does that correlate with insecurity?

## ***Standards Controlling Method's Operation***

- Are there standards for applying fuzzing?
- Is it practical to create a “standard” for fuzzing?
  - (See the SIGDeB:  
IFIP WG 10.4 Dependability Benchmarking SIG)

## ***Widespread Scientific Community Acceptance***

- Are there any papers advocating the technique?
- Are there many papers supporting the technique?
- Are there lots of credible papers both for and against?
  
- Is the technique actually being used the way that the papers say it should be used to be acceptable?
  - Rule 702: reliably applying the method to the specifics of the case

# Practical Issues

- Are judges (and PC reviewers) adequately trained to evaluate security publications?
  - Is there an accepted list of criteria that makes such publications “good?”
  - Are the lists of security “snake oil” scientifically proven to be predictive of junk science?
  - What should judge do if the academic community is split as to validity of technique?
- Beyond Daubert, at trial, things get complicated
  - This just determines whether someone gets to speak
  - The jury decides the outcome