53rd. IFIP WG 10.4 Meeting

Experimental Risk Assessment & Component-based Software Certification

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
Component-based Systems

What is the reason for use this approach? Reuse

What is the cost if a faulty component is retrieved from the repository?


Reuse is discouraged

Component-based Systems



Reused Component represents a Risk to the New System³

Modern Software



Software Products Certification is more crucial than ever



Key Idea


Software Certification

Estimating the RISK of using a COMPONENT in a larger system

Well-defined Standards Risk = prob(f) * cost(f) [Rosenberg 2000]

ISO/IEC 9126

A Quality model that focuses on software product



Certification for Reuse – ISO/IEC 9126

Satisfaction

Satisfying the user in a specific context of use

Let users reach specified **targets** with **accuracy** and **completeness** in a specific context of use

Effectiveness

Quality in Use

Safety

Present acceptable **levels of risk** of damage to individuals, businesses, software, property or the environment in a specific context of use

Productivity

Let users employing **appropriate amount of resources** in relation to the effectiveness achieved in a specific context of use

ISO/IEC 14598

Guides the planning and the execution of a evaluation process of software quality product

Can be used in conjunction with ISO/IEC 9126

Fundamental characteristics expected in the software products evaluation process:

repeatability

reproducibility


impartiality

objectivity


We got this all with our approach

Software Risk

How to estimate the risk on the use of components in my system?



Risk depends on the probability of the existence of residual fault in the component Risk depends on the residual fault activation and the impact in the system if it occurs



Now we have a repeatable, reproducible and objective evaluation

Experimental Risk Assessment

T Estimate the $prob(f_c)$ by using complexity metrics of the target component in a logistic regression analysis

Evaluate $cost(f_c)$ experimentally through the injection of software faults in the target component and measure its impact on the system under analysis

Use a real workload and operational profile during the fault injection experiments

I Use a realistic distribution of faults to be injected

Residual Fault Estimation

■ Based on logistic regression that is useful to address the relationship between metrics and the fault-proneness of components

H Logistic regression equation after a linear transformation

logit (*prob*) = ln
$$\left(\frac{prob}{1-prob}\right) = \alpha + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + ... + \beta_n x_n$$
 regression coefficient

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
Large Components

✓ Consider the weight of each sub-component related to the metric that best represent the system characteristics

$$prob_{g}(f) = \sum prob_{i}(f) * (Metrics_{i} / \sum Metrics_{i})$$

G-SWFIT

Injection of Sw Faults based on a set of fault injection operators resulted from a field study using G-SWFIT technique



Distribution of Fault Injected

The distribution of the number of faults to inject in each component is based on its fault proneness estimation through logistic regression

➡ For large components with a very large number of fault locations, faults are internally distributed according to the distribution observed in field study

For small components with a small number of fault locations, faults are distributed using the best approximation of the distribution observed in field study

Evaluation of the Cost

➡ After the injection of each fault, the cost is measured as the impact observed in the whole system as a consequence of the fault injected in the component

➡ The results measured by using fault injection include the probability of fault activation and the consequence of a failure, both measured through the impact observed

cost(f) = prob(fa) * c(failure)

Failure Modes

Hang – when the application is not able to terminate in the pre-determined time


♯ Crash – the application terminates abruptly before the workload is completed

Wrong – the workload terminates but the results are not correct

Correct – there are no errors reported and the result is correct

The Case Study

Satellite Data Handling Software (ESA)



Results - Metrics & Coefficients

Fault Density Likelihood Estimation


Metrics	RTLinux			RTEMS			
	Global Values	Coefficients	p-value	Global Values	. Coefficients	. p-value	
C.Complexity	39604	0.0072393	6.51 E-11	28536	0.0063537	7.09 E-05	
N. Parameters	10778	-0.0051718	0.185622	8454	0.0117627	0.012413	
N. Returns	13268	0.0431363	1.75 E-52	10240	0.0161907	0.000616	
Progr. Length	1172521	-0.0001692	0.001896	787949	-0.0005537	79 E-20	
Vocab. Size	171408	0.0011511	3.69 E-05	108550	0.0104020	2.48 E-47	
Max. Nest. Depth	3963	0.3746203	1.0 E-140	2478	0.2354918	3.88 E-27	

Application	# Module		LoC		C	Global		
Аррисации	# Would	<100	100- 400	>400	<25	25-40	>40	prob _g (f)
RTEMS	1257	87,0%	11,0%	2,0%	80,0%	6,0%	14,0%	7,5%
RTLinux	2212	90,0%	9,0%	1,0%	84,0%	6,0%	10,0%	6,5%

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Results - Failure Modes Obtained

Cost (or Impact) Estimation



Risk Evaluation and Certification

Risk Evaluation (Risk_c = $prob(f_c) * cost(f_c)$)

					· ·				Incorrect Behavior	
Component	prob(/)	cost(/)	risk	cost(f)	risk	. cost(/) .	risk	$\cos(f)$	··· risk ···	
RTEMS	0.0749	0.09	0.67%	0.05	0.37%	0.12	0.89%	0.26	1.94%	
RTLimix	0.0650	0.25	1.62%	0.01	0.06%	0.24	1.56%	0.50	3.25%	

Certification

Л

Component	nable	· · · Cra	sha	sha Wronga		Hang:		IncorrectBehavior	
	- Prond iss	cost(/):	risk a	cost(/)×	. riska	_ cost(/)∞	risk a	_ cost(/):::	riska
Standard:	×	×	1 %	×	0.5%×	×	1%%	×	706
RTEMS	0.0749×	0.09×	0.67%	0.05%	037%	0.12¤	0.89%	026×	194%¤
RTLinux	0.0650×	025×	1.62%	0.01×	0.06%	/0.24×	1.56%	0.50×	325%

Contributions & Conclusions

This work presents a first proposal to certify a componentbased system using experimental risk assessment

➡ Our risk equation considers the fault probability, the probability of fault activation, the probability of consequent deviation in the component behavior and the consequence of a failure

➡ Our approach assures a repeatable way of evaluating risk and removes the dependence on the evaluators that characterize classical risk evaluation approach

Future Works

To refine the risk evaluation considering other aspects in order to obtain a more realistic measure of software component risk

T o improve the certification measurement

To define threshold value for some product line to improve certification of software system based on risk assessment

References & Works

➡ Rosenberg, L., Stapko, R., Gallo, A. "Risk-based Object Oriented Testing". In: *Proc of. 13th International Software / Internet Quality Week-QW*, San Francisco, California, USA, 2000.

ISO/IEC 9126-1. International Organization For Standardization ISO/IEC 9126-1, Software Engineering – Software product quality – Part 1: Quality Model; Geneve ISO, 2001.

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Moraes, R., Durães, J., Barbosa, R., Martins, E., Madeira, H.
"Experimental Risk Assessment using Software Fault Injection", "The International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks"–DSN 07.

Thank you for your attention

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