Dependability vs Survivability vs Trustworthiness

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Based on A. Avizienis (UCLA), J.C. Laprie, B. Randell (Univ. Of Newcastle upon Tyne): *Fundamental Concepts* of *Dependability*

> 42 nd 10.4 meeting — Hilton Head Island Workshop on Dependability and Survivability

Concept	Dependability	Survivability	Trustworthiness
Goal	 ability of a system to deliver service that can justifiably be trusted ability of a system to avoid failures that are more frequent or more severe than is acceptable to the user(s) 	capability of a system to fulfill its mission in a timely manner	assurance that a system will perform as expected
Threats present	 design faults (e.g., software flaws, hardware errata, malicious logics) physical faults (e.g., production defects, physical deterioration) interaction faults (e.g., physical interference, input mistakes, attacks, including viruses, worms, intrusions) 	 1) attacks (e.g., intrusions, probes, denials of service) 2) failures (internally generated events due to, e.g., software design errors, hardware degradation, human errors, corrupted data) 3) accidents (externally generated events such as natural disasters) 	 hostile attacks (from hackers or insiders) environmental disruptions (accidental disruptions, either human-made or natural) human and operator errors (e.g., software flaws, mistakes by human operators)
Reference	«Fundamental concepts of dependability» ¹	«Survivable network systems» ²	«Trust in cyberspace» ³

1 A. Avizienis, J.C. Laprie, B. Randell, "Fundamental concepts of dependability", March 2001.


- 2 R.J. Ellison, D.A. Fischer, R.C. Linger, H.F. Lipson, T. Longstaff, N.R. Mead, "Survivable network systems: an emerging discipline", Technical Report CMU/SEI-97-TR-013, November 1997, revised May 1999.
- 3 F. Schneider, ed., *Trust in Cyberspace*, National Academy Press, 1999.

Dependability : ability to deliver service that can justifiably be trusted


- **Service** delivered by a system: its behavior as it is perceived by its user(s)
- **User**: another system that interacts with the former
- **Function** of a system: what the system is intended to do
- (Functional) Specification: description of the system function
- **Correct service**: when the delivered service implements the system function
- System failure: event that occurs when the delivered service deviates from correct service, either because the system does not comply with the specification, or because the specification did not adequately describe its function
- Failure modes: the ways in which a system can fail, ranked according to failure severities


Dependability: ability to avoid failures that are more frequent or more severe than is acceptable to the user(s)


When failures are more frequent or more severe than acceptable: **meta-failure**, i.e., a *dependability failure*





Absence of unauthorized access to, or handling of, system state

















Dependability, survivability, trustworthiness: three names for an essential property

- * All three concepts are essentially equivalent in their goals and address similar threats (trustworthiness omits the explicit listing of internal faults)
- Survivability was present in the late sixties in the military standards (system capacity to resist hostile environments so that the system can fulfill its mission)
- * Threats are listed in the definitions of survivability and trustworthiness, while both definitions of dependability leave the choice open